Mongolia Is Walking a Fragile Democratic Path

After its peaceful revolution in 1990, Mongolia earned its place on the map as an electoral democracy. Nestled between Russia and China, the country has become renowned for its system of free and fair elections—an outlier compared with other post-communist countries in the region.

From 1924 to 1990, the Mongolian People’s Republic was a one-party state under the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party (MPRP) as well as a satellite state of the Soviet Union. Before that, Mongolian territory was largely governed as a theocratic monarchy under the Bogd Khan, the Mongolian equivalent of the Dalai Lama, and controlled by the Qing empire that also ruled China.

Since its first democratic elections after the Cold War, Mongolia has been dominated by two ruling parties. In 2021, former Prime Minister Khurelsukh Ukhnaa became the country’s sixth president, restoring power to the MPRP, now called the Mongolian People’s Party (MPP).

On June 28, Mongolia held its first parliamentary elections since major constitutional changes were approved in May 2023. These reforms aimed at “strengthening the legislature, increasing transparency, and bringing parliamentarians closer to the people they serve” by adding 50 seats to the parliament, 19 of which will be elected through proportional representation. The ruling MPP won a very slim majority, taking just 68 seats in the new 126-seat body, and may now be forced into a coalition government.

Historically, it has been rare for a country to transition out of socialism and become a full-fledged electoral democracy. What is the source of Mongolia’s success—and can it keep maintaining its independence from Russia and China?

On Dec. 10, 1989, 200 protesters gathered in front of the Youth Cultural Center in Ulaanbaatar to demand Mongolia’s transition into democracy. Driven by concepts of glasnost and freedom of speech, the protesters argued for a multiparty system, free elections, universal suffrage, and human rights.

In Mongolia, the role of youth in political activism remains especially pronounced. Among East Asian countries, Mongolia’s population is the youngest, with about half of Mongolians under 30. According to a 2022 survey by the International Republican Institute, 66 percent of Mongolians between 18 and 35 years of age believe that democracy is the ideal form of government for their country. In a recent interview with the authors, former Mongolian President Elbegdorj Tsakhia commented, “If Mongolia wants to pursue a fully independent policy, it should have a democratic government. The best hope is our people, and we need to invest in our youth.”

As only 36 percent of young Mongolians believe that Mongolia’s political parties are adequately addressing the country’s needs, there is a strong sentiment that things must change in order for Mongolia to get on the right track. In April 2022, younger Mongolians flocked to Sukhbaatar Square in Ulaanbaatar to protest police brutality and demand social and economic reforms. That December, amid a corruption scandal involving the theft of $12.9 billion worth of coal, younger generations protested en masse against Prime Minister Oyun-Erdene Luvsannamsrai’s government, in what became Mongolia’s second-largest peaceful protest since 1991. In response, Mongolian authorities announced plans to implement anti-corruption reforms for the state-owned mining firm complicit in the theft.

The increasingly public and vocal demands of Mongolia’s younger generations have not only brought about direct responses by Mongolian authorities but also served as the engine behind a broader political will for political and social change.

For the past 30 years, Mongolia has successfully kept its political distance from Russia and China. It has largely done so through its foreign policy of pursuing relations with “third neighbors,” or other democratically leaning countries with market economies. This approach has allowed Mongolia to strengthen its sovereignty and expand its connections beyond its authoritarian neighbors.

At the same time, Mongolia has also maintained strategic bilateral partnerships with Russia and China, in order to sustain friendly, balanced relations and avoid provoking its powerful neighbors. This intentional balance can be seen in Mongolia’s repeated abstinence from condemning Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and its hesitance to join regional alliances such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.

But in recent years, declining voter participation has been concerning, with turnout for the recent presidential elections dropping from 69 percent in the first round in 2017 to just 59 percent in 2021. This election, from early numbers, saw a rise back to 69 percent—a sign that younger generations may continue driving Mongolia’s democratic progress. Otherwise, the country’s fate could rest in the hands of an aging generation whose interest groups cling to more traditional, pre-Cold War politics that push them closer to Moscow.

If turnout is predominated by traditional interest groups, Mongolia could more easily fall prey to Russia’s and China’s increasing efforts to ensnare the country’s resources, economic environment, and geopolitical relations. This could have dire implications on the country’s political and economic trajectory and could threaten to undo decades of progress toward democratization.

As Mongolia’s economy is strongly intertwined with Russia’s and China’s, it will take major efforts by the next Mongolian parliament to maintain the country’s decades of democratic consolidation.

In particular, it is vital for Mongolia to diversify its economy away from China and Russia and expand its economic partnerships with third neighbors, in order to relinquish its dependence on these two great powers. Over the past 10 years, Mongolia has traded $85 billion with China and $17 billion with Russia—in contrast to only $2.6 billion with the United States. Almost 90 percent of Mongolia’s export revenue is derived from minerals, the majority of which pass through or are bought by China. Chinese companies are heavily invested in the Mongolian mining industry—although this has also created anti-Chinese feeling among Mongolians, as many firms prefer imported workers to hiring Mongolians.

Mongolia is also a crucial transit region for natural gas between its great-power neighbors. Ninety-five percent of Mongolia’s fuel comes from Russia, and both countries are currently scoping the development of the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline with China—currently held up by Chinese demands for ever cheaper prices but potentially a strategic win for Moscow as Europe seeks to disentangle from Russia’s energy markets. With a third of the pipeline running through Mongolia, it would be a potential boon for economic growth.

Along with Russia, Moscow’s deepening economic relationship with China could put a damper on its efforts to distance itself from these authoritarian regimes. China recently agreed to loan more than $250 million to Mongolia to finance the Erdeneburen hydropower plant, as part of its 2015 agreement to loan $1 billion to Mongolia to advance its infrastructure.

Elbegdorj, the former Mongolian president, told Foreign Policy that Mongolia is “becoming more and more dependent on China. Our main priority is to balance it [and increase] investment from other countries.” Diversifying its economy could be a strong first step.

While full economic independence from its two giant neighbors is effectively impossible for Mongolia, there are still steps the country can take to continue resisting foreign political and economic influence from its authoritarian neighbors.

Most notably, the rise in global demand for renewable energy sources has the potential to place Mongolia in the spotlight and strengthen its relations with third neighbors. As Mongolia is abundant in natural resources—especially copper, coal, and rare earths—countries such as the United States are starting to turn to Mongolia for minerals and clean energy sources as an alternative to China.

For example, Mongolia is rich in copper and molybdenum, which are used in solar and wind technologies. As global demand for copper could rise by 45 percent by 2040, Mongolia could capitalize on this opportunity to export its minerals to other countries and further weaken its reliance on Russia and China.

The United States has already committed to working with Mongolia on countering climate change and developing adaptation policies in the agriculture and clean energy sectors. Last year, it reaffirmed its intention to collaborate with Mongolia on renewable energy and energy security.

By expanding and strengthening its economic relationships with third neighbors, Mongolia will have a stronger chance of economically decoupling from Russia and China and creating a blueprint for Central Asian countries to do the same.

Yet especially after enduring a harsh winter dzud for the second year in a row—a slow-onset, livestock-killing, extreme winter phenomenon in Mongolia that now threatens 90 percent of the country—Mongolia needs to maintain its momentum for democratic reform more than ever in order to strengthen its environmental and economic governance in response to climate change.

Further, not all of the recent constitutional reforms have been in the interests of the Mongolian people. As Elbegdorj sees it, most constitutional amendments are “based on emotions, selective surveys, and nonrepresentative discussions,” which may damage democratic development in the long run.

For example, a recent law establishing a sovereign wealth fund—which will take 34 percent of shares from strategic mineral assets going forward—is what Elbegdorj refers to as “pure resource nationalism coupled with socialist nationalization.”

Driven forward by the latest constitutional amendments, the former president told us that this has “scared our third neighbors and endangered Mongolia’s fragile sovereignty and freedom, and our next generation will face immense hardship to fix it.”