Modi’s Third-Term Foreign Policy Looks the Same

India recently concluded its six-week general election, in which more than 640 million people exercised their right to vote. Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) have returned for a third term, but for the first time in his career, Modi was unable to win outright. He and his party must now rely on coalition partners, notably two regional parties: the Telugu Desam Party and Janata Dal (United).

The reality of a coalition government will undoubtedly limit Modi’s domestic agenda, but it is unlikely to alter India’s approach to foreign policy. The BJP’s partners have minimal interest in foreign-policy issues, giving Modi and his team a free hand to pursue their agenda on the global stage. As a result, India-U.S. relations should not shift markedly—and certainly not until after the U.S. elections in November.

As in many other countries, India’s elections tend to prioritize domestic issues over foreign affairs. For the typical Indian voter, matters such as economics and identity politics tend to overshadow foreign policy. This election cycle was no different: To the extent that foreign-policy issues were brought into the election discourse, Modi and the BJP sought to use international engagement to convey nationalist messages about India’s growing prominence in the world.

India used its turn as president and host of the G-20 in 2023 to showcase Modi’s clout with other world leaders. Similarly, when spokespeople from Western governments expressed concern over the erosion of India’s tradition of liberal democracy in the run-up to the election—particularly the arrest of key opposition leaders and the freezing of rival parties’ bank accounts—Indian officials responded assertively, essentially saying the criticism reflected foreign resentment of India’s inexorable rise to power.

Such affronted reactions were commonplace well before this election, and India’s foreign-policy establishment is likely to maintain this prideful posture. New Delhi only stands to gain from taking a harsh tone with the West: Its domestic audience responds well to such rhetoric, while Western powers—with the notable exception of Canada—seem willing to overlook India’s outbursts. As the Indian economy, its diaspora, and its strategic capabilities grow, Western countries are unlikely to get caught in a battle of rhetorical posturing.

The election result is also likely to assuage some concerns about India’s democratic decline, which has been a source of tension between India and some of its Western partners. India’s main opposition parties all seemed to agree that India’s Election Commission managed the machinery of elections—specifically the safety of voters and the counting of votes—more or less effectively. For some foreign critics, this exercise seems to be proof enough that India’s democracy is robust.

Of course, democracy requires deeper commitments. It remains troubling that Arvind Kejriwal, a major opposition leader from the Aam Aadmi Party, was arrested on corruption charges in the thick of the general election campaign. The Indian Supreme Court questioned the timing of Kejriwal’s arrest and ultimately granted him bail during the election season. Now, Kejriwal finds himself back in judicial custody.

Beyond rhetoric, the election did not meaningfully alter India’s foreign-policy establishment. The major portfolios will continue to be led by the same ministers. Amit Shah, Modi’s alter ego, has retained control of the Ministry of Home Affairs. S. Jaishankar has returned as minister of external affairs. Rajnath Singh will continue to lead the Ministry of Defense, while Ajit Doval—the national security advisor since 2014—has also returned to his post. This continuity suggests that Modi’s foreign-policy priorities will remain intact.

This returning team is likely to keep a close eye on China, which has taken aggressive actions on its disputed border with India since 2020. If Russia and China continue to deepen relations in the coming years, New Delhi may have to reassess its long-standing partnership with Moscow. India will continue to pursue its interests in the rest of South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Central Asia without much change. Its willingness to partner with Western countries—particularly the United States—will also continue, although India has signaled hesitation to give away much in return for Western support.

From Washington’s standpoint, policy change toward New Delhi is similarly unlikely. There is little daylight between how either U.S. President Joe Biden or former U.S. President Donald Trump would approach India during a second term. Both would continue to court India as a strategic bulwark to China; neither would find much traction with the country on the matter of Taiwan. Biden and Trump would both keep encouraging India to develop alternative supply chains. The coalition government may even make India a more attractive market for U.S. investment.

Furthermore, India-U.S. ties in the defense sector will continue to deepen. For example, the United States and India reached a major defense production agreement last year involving the co-production of Stryker armored vehicles in India. Such partnerships are only likely to continue as India seeks its own defense capabilities and the U.S. seeks to wean India from Russian reliance.

However, Biden and Trump do seem to have different personal relationships with Modi, which could affect the tenor of the India-U.S. relationship. Although Biden has formally courted Modi, Trump and Modi appear to be fonder of one another, holding several joint rallies in each other’s countries. Of course, Trump’s bombastic personality adds an element of unpredictability to the partnership, which colored a mini-tariff war between the countries toward the end of Trump’s administration.

Another possible difference between a Biden or Trump administration concerns India’s human rights record, but even here there may be more similarities than differences. Furthermore, the BJP’s electoral setback means that Modi must depend on potentially mercurial coalition partners, a scenario that is expected to keep his Hindu nationalist agenda in check. And after being caught nearly red-handed for alleged involvement in assassination plots in Canada and the United States, India will likely avoid any further attempts at transnational repression.

Nevertheless, if these sensitive issues do reemerge, a second Biden administration would likely send mixed signals to India. It is no secret that there are divides in the current White House when it comes to India. Many officials are keen to deepen ties, but some progressive voices remain critical of Modi and the BJP. By contrast, a second Trump administration would probably stay silent on human rights issues, as long as they were contained to India or the broader region.

These differences aside, India’s election brings mostly welcome portents for the U.S.-India relationship. However, the coalition dynamic is likely to undermine Modi’s ability to deliver on at least two domestic policy changes that will have consequences for its foreign affairs.

First, the issue of labor law reform will be postponed. India’s labor laws vary widely but are broadly seen as unfriendly to business, especially foreign firms. (In recent years, both General Motors and Ford left the Indian market.) Many domestic and foreign observers hoped that with a clear-cut majority in parliament, Modi might be able to change the laws at last. But facing considerable organized opposition—and given that underemployment was a key issue in the election—a weakened BJP-led government isn’t likely to wade into the battle. As a result, foreign firms will have to weigh the challenges of relying on Indian labor.

Second, the chance of India modifying its nuclear liability law now seems less likely. The legislation was adopted after the 2008 passage of the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement and essentially cuts against that deal, placing liabilities on foreign firms seeking to provide nuclear infrastructure for civilian energy purposes—with certain exceptions and workarounds for Russian state-owned suppliers. Foreign nuclear firms have largely stayed out of India. Officials in both the Biden and Trump administrations have been keen to see revision to the law, but Modi is unlikely to expend serious political capital on the matter.

These two likely impediments, although frustrating for foreign investors, must be seen as the cost of doing business with an emerging power that just restored some of its democratic credentials. Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. administrations have meaningfully engaged with India on a variety of fronts and in the process learned that New Delhi is not an easy negotiating partner. Although the U.S.-India relationship will no doubt see its share of ebbs and flows, it will overall remain on a relatively steady course under Modi’s coalition government.

Consequently, the failure to move forward on specific issues will not sandbag a burgeoning and multifaceted strategic partnership. Despite India’s many idiosyncratic features, the United States—as well as other Western powers—wants to partner with the country now more than ever. It is far too consequential a market, too crucial to breaking supply chain bottlenecks, and too important a player in perhaps the world’s most strategically fraught neighborhood.