Will South Africa’s ANC Be Forced to Govern in a Coalition?

In 2024, South Africa has firmly entered the era of uncertainty. The once-unassailable dominance of the ruling African National Congress (ANC) government is now at risk. But in a democracy, uncertainty can be a boon or a bane.

Substantive uncertainty­—where the unpredictable outcome of elections can invigorate democratic contestation by compelling political elites to be more responsive to society—is good. But another equally important (but altogether more frightening) characteristic of uncertainty is institutional uncertainty—situations where the rules of the game are under threat. This can erode democratic norms and pave the way for instability. South Africa is animated by both.

South Africa is a thriving electoral democracy. This is the seventh national election since the 1994 transition to democracy. The country is also robust in the social practice of democracy as a set of norms—essential liberties are widely used and abused, fundamental freedoms are intact, socioeconomic rights have been extended, and there is plenty of space for free political organization and contestation, and to give vent to political voice and exercise political choice; although the ANC has ruled on a national level for 30 years, opposition parties have won control in provincial and local elections, showing that democratic competition is alive and well.

Even if South Africa does not have a democracy problem, it does have a democratic governance problem: The legitimacy of its democratic institutions is unquestionable, but their credibility is not. Since 1994, the promise of a responsive and representative government has been continually deferred, undermined as it has been by self-serving politics and the pursuit of power for patronage and predation.

Political parties are seemingly more interested in parochial concerns. Internally fixated, they appear obsessed with proximity to power rather than addressing societal need. This has led to a widespread crisis of representation and responsiveness, where public institutions are perceived as insulated and unaccountable, evidenced by eroding levels of trust in political institutions over the past two decades—a trend shown by the Afrobarometer surveys and the 2023 Reconciliation Barometer report published by the Institute for Justice and Reconciliations.

Political parties fare even worse. The same Afrobarometer shows that in 2006, trust in the governing ANC stood at 62 percent, but by recent measures, it has plummeted to 27 percent. Opposition parties fare little better, with trust declining from 29 to 24 percent. Even the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), historically a bastion of reliability, has seen its trust eroded.

This year, the IEC faced an existential crisis, with the former president of the ANC and the country, Jacob Zuma, putting himself up for election as part of another party, known as the uMkhonto weSizwe Party (MK). Though the MK party that Zuma leads is a legitimate contestant, he is himself precluded from running due to a constitutional prohibition on anyone convicted of an offense and sentenced to more than 12 months imprisonment. (Zuma was handed a 15-month sentence after defying a summons to appear before the Commission of Enquiry into State Capture.)

The Constitutional Court recently overturned an Electoral Court ruling that had given Zuma the green light to run in the upcoming elections, instead choosing to uphold the IEC decision barring Zuma from holding office.

South Africa’s electoral system has contributed to the problem. It was designed in the early post-apartheid era and set up as a closed list, pure proportional representation system to ensure inclusivity and diversity in a society scarred by segregation. While this system has brought diverse voices into the political arena, it has also fostered fragmentation. (Currently, 10 percent of the electorate is represented by 11 different political parties, while of the top three parties, the Economic Freedom Fighters party represents about 10 percent, the Democratic Alliance party represents 21 percent, and the remaining 57 percent is represented by the ANC.)

This fragmentation has also led to a proliferation of parties; 52 parties will compete in the 2024 elections alongside 11 independent candidates. The very mechanism intended to democratize representation now finds itself accused of diluting it.

The 2024 elections will be conducted under a new electoral system that is likely to replicate the dysfunction wrought by the pure proportional representation system in which party loyalty supersedes public interest. Mandated by the Constitutional Court to accommodate independent candidates, the new electoral system essentially remains a party-list, compensatory proportional representation system that will simply accommodate independent candidates within its framework.

To do this, the 400-member National Assembly is split into two equal segments. In one segment, each of the 200 seats is designated for a constituency within one of South Africa’s nine provinces. For these seats, independent candidates can compete alongside political parties. The share of these seats for each province depends on its population size. A further 200 compensatory seats are reserved exclusively for political parties to contest.

Any independent candidates who receive voter support that exceeds the threshold required to hold a seat will forfeit all those additional votes, while political parties accumulate all their votes and benefit from additional seats in the proportional representation system. This dynamic will continue to breed a political environment in which party fealty is prized above constituency responsiveness.

It is unsurprising, then, that voter turnout has been steadily declining. This is not due to apathy or disinterest but is instead a function of discontent and the declining trust in representative institutions.

The growing disillusionment with the political system has seen voter participation drop from 89.3 percent in 1999 to 66.1 percent in 2019. Projections for 2024 indicate a potential low turnout of 43 percent, a medium turnout of 59 percent, and a high of 74 percent depending on public sentiment and voters’ desire to reward or punish the ANC. Lower turnout levels can lead to uneven representation and undermine the legitimacy of elected officials, making it harder for any party to claim a strong mandate.

The ANC in particular is struggling with declining public trust and continued internal divisions, having already fragmented and given rise to four new parties from within its fold—the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), African Transformation Movement, African Congress for Transformation (ACT), and MK.

This decline reflects widespread disillusionment with the ANC’s governance, characterized by corruption, inefficiency, and a failure to deliver on key promises. The party’s waning dominance opens the door to coalition politics, but also raises the stakes for the May elections.

Provinces such as Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) will be critical battlegrounds. In the former province, the ANC’s grip is tenuous; in the latter, the political landscape is further complicated by factions loyal to Zuma, who continues to exert influence despite his controversial tenure.

While many analysts predict a loss of the ANC’s majority, such an outcome is far from guaranteed. The ANC’s deep-rooted presence and organizational structure provide it with a resilience that opinion polls and other statistical methods often fail to capture. The party’s ability to mobilize its base—including the country’s poor Black majority and emergent Black elites—even amid internal challenges, plays a crucial role in its electoral performance.

Despite declining support, projections suggest that the ANC could still secure a slim majority or even the largest share of votes. My calculations based on historical electoral performance and voting patterns since 1999—modeling voter turnout, adjusting for and weighting declines in the credibility of the ANC, and accounting for its four rival splinter parties—suggests that the ANC could maintain a slim majority or secure power through coalitions with one or two small parties.

Since 1999, the ANC’s share of the vote has consistently declined, yet it managed to hold a majority in the 2019 elections with 57.5 percent of the vote. Even if this trend continues, a drop to around 51.5 percent is plausible, allowing the ANC to retain between 202 and 207 seats in the National Assembly.

Meanwhile, the opposition—particularly the Democratic Alliance (DA), a party that has historically been mostly supported by whites and a small multiracial elite—faces its own set of challenges. A so-called “moonshot” coalition proposed by the DA with parties such as ActionSA, the Freedom Front Plus, and potentially the Inkatha Freedom Party, aims to challenge the ANC.

However, the feasibility of such a coalition is questionable. Prospects for the coalition appear dim. My calculations of projected performance of the constituent parties based on past electoral performance and voter turnout modeling would, in its best possible outcome, see the coalition win a little more than 46 percent of votes and 195 seats, six short of a parliamentary majority.

The DA’s governance in regions such as the Western Cape has shown promise, but also mirrors some of the same issues of unaccountability and internal discord seen in the ANC. It has also given rise to a raft of about four parties that split from within it, the most prominent being the Build One South Africa party of former DA leader Mmusi Maimane and ActionSA, which is led by Herman Mashaba, a former Johannesburg mayor when he was in the DA, along with many other former DA leaders dissatisfied with the party’s approach to addressing socioeconomic inequality and corruption. At least one of these parties, Action SA has now joined the DA’s multiparty coalition formation.

The coalition’s prospects are further complicated by the diverse and often conflicting agendas of its members. The likelihood of smooth cooperation among these parties is low, given historical and ideological differences. This could lead to a fragmented and unstable coalition, undermining effective governance.

Whatever the outcome, South Africa’s 2024 elections hold little promise of rectifying and resolving the systemic dysfunction of its democratic governance processes. While the legitimacy of the post-1994 settlement is not at stake, its credibility is. The historical specters of colonialism and apartheid still cast long shadows over the country’s present, but it is its contemporary politics that are characterized by a game of shifting alliances, parochial insularity, and self-serving agendas that bedevil it most.

Parties in the incumbent government—such as the ANC, and to a lesser extent the DA—have behaved in ways in which they exercise authority without accountability and power without responsibility. In office, the ANC behaves with arrogance and near absolute impunity.

The lack of ideological cohesion among parties has led to the rise of coalition politics in South Africa. These coalitions have complicated governance at the local level, particularly in major metropolitan areas, which have become battlegrounds of fragile alliances, marked by constant infighting and brinkmanship. These coalitions, often formed out of political expediency rather than shared vision, have been characterized by instability and inefficiency. The result is a governmental environment where oversight and accountability are minimal—and where policy implementation is erratic.

In the face of this quagmire at the national level, the proposal of a government of national unity has emerged as a pragmatic, albeit imperfect, solution. A national unity government, ideally comprising the two largest parties—or combining all parties with electoral support above a 10 percent threshold, each allocated an executive portfolio proportionate to its support—would offer a semblance of stability in a sea of uncertainty. However, this approach is not without its risks—including entrenching a political elite, reducing accountability, and deferring necessary systemic reforms.

A potential coalition between the ANC and the DA, though fraught with challenges, offers a path toward stability. By leveraging their respective strengths, especially the distinct social classes and racial groups that they represent, these parties can potentially foster accountability and responsiveness, which are essential elements for effective governance. Such an arrangement, while not devoid of risks, presents an opportunity for meaningful political reform.

On the other hand, the ANC combining with the radical EFF would be fraught with risks. The latter party, being a breakaway faction of the ANC (after the expulsion of its leader, Julius Malema), shares a symbiotic yet contentious relationship with the ANC. This coalition could exacerbate social divisions through populist policies and rhetoric that targets racial minorities and the small but wealthy white elite, while intensifying predatory politics and undermining institutional integrity and governance.

But if the ANC retains a majority and once again rules alone, it is likely to continue down a path of institutional decay and organizational dysfunction. The party’s internal divisions and predatory politics could lead to greater instability and ineffectiveness in government, likely perpetuating the paralysis that led to the current crisis of credibility.