Congress Has the Power to Halt U.S. Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia

Only five days after Saudi Arabia and Iran agreed to normalize relations, the Senate moved one step closer to possibly ending U.S. arms sales to Riyadh through legislation that could redefine the entire U.S.-Saudi relationship.

On March 15, Democratic Sen. Chris Murphy and Republican Sen. Mike Lee introduced a privileged resolution that would require the State Department to produce a report on Saudi Arabia’s human rights record as well as its conduct in Yemen. Once Congress has received the report—which, given the kingdom’s long history of abuses, is likely to show a consistent pattern of human rights violations—Congress could vote to end U.S. security assistance.

The preparation of a report—a document that will draw from the State Department’s existing annual human rights reports, which are also mandated by Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act—is relatively uncontroversial. It is the second part of the process that has the potential to transform the U.S.-Saudi security relationship. Once the report has been received, Congress has the option to trigger a vote on ending the sale of U.S. weapons to Riyadh.

Section 502B has never been used to block a weapons sale. It has been invoked only once, in 1976, and then only to compel reports on the human rights abuses of Argentina, Iran, and four other countries receiving U.S. weapons in the context of the Cold War, when the U.S. government consistently ignored or supported the state-led abuse of leftists in the name of countering communism.

By invoking 502B, a powerful but untested provision of the Foreign Assistance Act, Murphy and Lee could initiate a shift not only in the U.S. security relationship with Saudi Arabia but in its relationships with other systematic human rights abusers that currently receive U.S. security assistance.

Saudi demands include a U.S. security guarantee, such as major non-NATO ally status; more weapons sales; and U.S. support for a civilian nuclear energy program. This final condition includes the provision that the Saudis enrich their own fissile material, giving them access to the building blocks of a nuclear weapon. Analysts have pointed out the folly of prioritizing Israel’s interests over those of the United States in granting concessions to the Saudis.

Murphy has questioned the wisdom of business as usual with Riyadh, especially under the guise of fostering Saudi normalization with Israel. “If we’re going to enter into a relationship with the Saudis where we’re doing more significant arms sales, it should be in exchange for better behavior toward the United States, not just better behavior toward Israel,” he told the New York Times.

Murphy and Lee’s resolution could effectively torpedo Saudi demands by limiting or ending U.S. weapons sales exactly when the Saudis have asked for easier access to U.S. armaments.

For skeptics of the Saudis, including many in Congress, these concessions risk not only permanently shackling the United States to an unreliable partner in Riyadh but also sparking a nuclear arms race in a region already awash in weapons. If Saudi Arabia is allowed to access the materials needed to develop a nuclear weapon, Iran will feel an even greater imperative to develop its own offensive nuclear capacities, beyond the existing need to defend against Israeli nukes.

If Tel Aviv, Tehran, and Riyadh all possess nuclear bombs, other Gulf countries, such as the United Arab Emirates and Qatar, are likely to insist on access to nuclear technologies as well, sparking nuclear proliferation across the whole region and potentially beyond.

Murphy and Lee’s resolution could effectively torpedo Saudi demands by limiting or ending U.S. weapons sales exactly when the Saudis have asked for easier access to U.S. armaments. Their legislation could push Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman closer to Beijing, although a full transition away from a U.S.-based weapons system would take decades and hundreds of billions of dollars, given the scope of Saudi dependence on U.S. weaponry and contractors.

The Biden administration argued that under these conditions, a war powers resolution was unnecessary, as the United States was no longer involved in an active bombing campaign. Sanders and other supporters of the resolution maintained that it was necessary to prevent future U.S. support for Saudi aggression, given the likelihood that hostilities could reignite. Recent reports of Houthi attacks on the oil-rich territory of Marib in central Yemen confirm the fleeting nature of the country’s fragile peace.

On the Senate floor on Dec. 13, Murphy spoke in support of a Yemen war powers resolution: “The United States should not be involved in this war. … This war, every day it persists, makes us less safe, and it harms our credibility.” Later that evening, Sanders withdrew the resolution in the face of stiff opposition from the White House and in exchange for a commitment from Biden to work to end U.S. involvement.

Sanders feared he would not have the votes to pass the resolution, given that he sought to rally a Democrat-held Senate to vote against a Democratic president, at a time when the durability of the truce made the war in Yemen appear less urgent. A failed war powers resolution could jeopardize future congressional efforts to rein in the unconstitutional usurpation of war powers authority by the executive branch.

Arguably, if Congress intends to truly reform the U.S.-Saudi relationship, both a war powers resolution and 502B will be necessary. A war powers resolution would cut off U.S. military personnel from supporting the Saudi war, such as by servicing planes, and 502B would target training, funding, weapons, and contractor support. The joint resolution of disapproval that could be triggered by 502B offers Congress flexibility in how to reconfigure U.S. military assistance.

If Congress decides to limit or end security assistance to Riyadh, U.S. arms manufacturers would lose their biggest customer.

Although 502B allows Congress to exercise discretion in how it chooses to respond, the provision is clear about how it defines gross violations of internationally recognized human rights. Saudi Arabia consistently engages in such conduct, and recent years have witnessed a significant increase in repression, corresponding with the crown prince’s effort to transform Saudi Arabia’s economy and society under the auspices of his ambitious Vision 2030.

In 2018, Human Rights Watch documented a massive uptick in the numbers of individuals arbitrarily detained without criminal charges. Mass executions continue, including of individuals charged with crimes they allegedly committed as children. The State Department’s recently released report on human rights in Saudi Arabia for 2022 details a litany of abuses committed by the Saudi state, not only of its own citizens but of the population of Yemen.

If Congress decides to limit or end security assistance to Riyadh, U.S. arms manufacturers would lose their biggest customer. Given the high stakes and the lobbying power of arms companies, a complete halt to weapons sales to Riyadh appears unlikely. Yet such a shift would arguably reflect Biden’s declared commitment to human rights and his assertion that the U.S. government should do all it can to promote and uphold democracy—the justification his administration has used to send more than $100 billion worth of assistance to Ukraine.

Using 502B to limit or end U.S. security assistance to Saudi Arabia could signal a transformation in the United States’ role in the world, away from global arms dealers and toward greater sincerity on human rights. Unfortunately, many in Washington dread such an outcome and will work ferociously to put a stop to Murphy and Lee’s resolution. If Biden is serious about human rights, he must not let them win.